Abstract. In this work we study the design of secure protocols for linear algebra problems. All current solutions to the problem are either inefficient in terms of communication complexity or assume that the adversary is honest but curious. We design protocols for two different adversarial settings: First, we achieve security in the presence of a covert adversary, a notion recently introduced by [Aumann and Lindell, TCC 2007]. Roughly speaking, this guarantees that if the adversary deviates from the protocol in a way that allows him to cheat, then he will be caught with good probability. Second, we achieve security against arbitrary malicious behaviour in the presence of a computationally unbounded adversary that controls less than a third of the parties. Our main result is a new upper bound of O(n 2+1/t ) communication for testing singularity of a shared n×n matrix in constant round, for any constant t in both of these adversarial environments. We use this construction to design secure protocols for computing the rank of a shared matrix and solving a shared linear system of equations with similar efficiency.
Introduction
Solving a set of linear equations is one of the most basic algorithmic tasks, with numerous applications to various fields. In a distributed system, linear constraints may reflect sensitive information and thus parties who wish to solve a joint set of equations are interested in revealing as little information as possible on their input. Research in secure multiparty computation (MPC) has been impressively successful in allowing secure computation of every function with efficiency that is proportional to its circuit complexity [BGW88, CCD88, Yao86, GMW87] . However, for various linear algebraic tasks, these general constructions fall well short of giving optimal protocols in terms of communication and round complexity. Starting with the work of Cramer and Damgård [CD01] , the task of designing secure protocols for linear algebraic problems has been the focus of several recent works in secure computation [NW06, KMWF07, CKP07] .
We focus on the problem of deciding the singularity of a shared matrix M ∈ F n×n , where is a finite field. Many linear algebraic tasks, e.g. solving a joint set of linear equations and computing the rank of a shared matrix, are efficiently reducible to this task. When no honest majority is assumed, as in the classic two-party setting, our protocols are secure in the presence of a covert adversary [AL07] , assuming the existence of public key homomorphic encryption schemes. Previous communication efficient secure protocols for linear algebra were known only in the honest but curious setting. In case there is a guarantee that the adversary controls less than one third (one half) of the parties, our protocols are secure against malicious (honest but curious) behaviour relying on no computational assumptions. Our protocols are constant round and achieve communication complexity of O(n 2+1/t ) for every constant t. This is the first constant round construction for secure linear algebra with nearly linear communication complexity in the input size.
Applying General Results Fails. Unfortunately, general results in MPC do not yield efficient protocols for linear algebra. This is due to the fact that the communication complexity linearly depends on the Boolean circuit complexity of the function to be computed (or on the number of multiplication gates in case of information theoretic security). Alas, the circuit complexity of matrix singularity, as well as that of many other linear algebraic problem, is tightly related to that of matrix product [BCS97] . The best known upper bound for circuits for matrix product is O(n ω ) [CW87] with ω ∼ = 2.38, which is significantly larger than the input size. Moreover, in the information theoretic setting the round complexity of the protocols is related to the multiplicative depth of the corresponding circuit, preventing these general construction from yielding constant round protocols. This leads to the following approach: Design efficient protocols for matrix product and then use them to achieve protocols for other linear algebraic tasks.
Matrix Product in Realistic Adversary Models. Therefore, our first step is to design constant round secure protocols for matrix product in the covert setting and in the information theoretic malicious setting with communication complexity O(n 2 ). In the honest but curious setting, simple solutions for this problems are achieved using homomorphic encryption in the computational setting and linear secret sharing schemes in the information theoretic setting. However, when arbitrary adversarial behavior is considered, this task becomes more involved. Since very few efficient secure protocols for interesting problems are known in the malicious setting when no honest majority is assumed, Aumann and Lindell [AL07] have defined an interesting compromise: protocols that are secure in the presence of a covert adversary. Roughly speaking, the security guarantee is that if the adversary deviates from the protocol in a way that allows him to "cheat", then the honest parties are guaranteed to detect this cheating with good probability (e.g. 1/2). The ability to tolerate cheating with some fixed probability turns out useful for secure computation of matrix product and, consequently, for other secure linear algebraic tasks.
Techniques for Matrix Product. The general idea behind our secure protocol for matrix product in the covert setting, is to compute a decomposition of the input matrices into additive shares and then use homomorphic encryption to perform the computation on these shares. We use the random strings of the encryption scheme to prove that the additive shares indeed sum up to the input matrix, avoiding expensive zero knowledge proofs. Towards this goal, we need the homomorphic encryption scheme to have a property that all the known schemes enjoy: when computing C = E(m 1 , r 1 ) + E(m 2 , r 2 ), one can compute a string r such that C = E(m 1 + m 2 , r). We note that although not every homomorphic encryption scheme has this property, some well known encryption schemes, such as the one by Paillier [Pal99] , are suitable for our purposes. After the computations take place, the parties reveal parts of their additive sharing of the input, catching cheating adversaries 1 with probability 1/2. Revealing parts of the decomposition of the input enables easy input extraction, which makes the simulation go through.
Constant Round Reduction From Singularity to Matrix
Product. Unfortunately, in spite of the tight connection of matrix product and linear algebraic problems such as matrix singularity, efficient protocols for the former does not immediately imply efficient protocols for the latter. The reason is that the known reductions do not translate to protocols with constant round complexity. Therefore, we need to design a special purpose protocol for matrix singularity, equipped with our secure protocol for matrix product. We use ideas from [Wie86] , [KP91] , and [KS91] to reduce the problem of deciding the singularity of a general matrix M into deciding the singularity of a related Toeplitz matrix T . We then use a lemma by Leverrier [JáJ92] which reduces the problem into computing the traces of powers of T . Finally, we define the Toeplitz matrix of polynomials (I − λT ) and use the Gohberg-Semencul formula for the inverse of a Toeplitz matrix, to compute the above traces efficiently. We rely on techniques for iterated matrix product [CKP07] (which, in turn, is based on techniques from [BIB89] ), combined with some simple linear algebraic manipulations, to translate the above algorithmic ideas into a constant round secure protocol for matrix singularity with the above mentioned communication complexity.
Related Work
Information theoretic setting. Cramer and Damgård initiated the study of secure protocols for solving various linear algebra problems [CD01] . Their work was done in the information theoretic multi-party setting, with the main focus on achieving constant round complexity. [NW06] . However, this protocol has polynomial round complexity (Ω(n 0.27 )) and is proved secure only in the honest but curious model. (The protocols of [CD01] and [CKP07] are secure in the malicious model, assuming the adversary controls less that a third of the parties.)
Computational Setting. As previously noted, using the general well-known garbled circuit method of Yao [Yao82] , one can get a constant round protocol for various linear algebraic problems with communication complexity that is proportional to the Boolean circuit complexity of matrix multiplication, for which the best upper bound known is O(n ω ) [CW87] for ω ∼ = 2.38. As discussed above, the protocol of [NW06] was the first to improve the communication complexity to roughly O(n 2 ), in the price of large round complexity. Later, Kiltz et al. [KMWF07] improved on the round complexity to get a protocol with O(log n) rounds and communication complexity of roughly O(n 2 ). However, this protocol is secure only in the honest but curious setting.
Organization In section 2 we introduce the necessary definitions and primitives. In sections 3 and 4, we design secure and efficient protocols for matrix product in the covert setting and information theoretic setting respectively. In section 5, we reduce the problem of securely testing singularity of a matrix to a secure matrix product, put everything together, give our main theorem and explain how to extend our results to other linear algebra problems.
Preliminaries
Notation. Our protocols work with elements over a finite field, which we denote by . We guarantee the security with probability 1 − O(n 2 )/| |, where | | is size of the field and n is the size of matrices we deal with in our linear algebra problems. Letting | | be superpolynomial in n, we can achieve protocols with negligible error probability.
3 We count the communication complexity of our protocols in terms of number of field elements communicated. By default, a vector v ∈ n is regarded as a column vector. By [x] we refer to the ring of polynomials over , and by [[x] ] to the field of rational functions over . Given a collection of matrices C 1 , . . . , C p over where all the C i 's have the same number of rows, we denote by |C 1 |C 2 | . . . |C p | the block matrix resulted by concatenating the C 1 , . . . , C p .
Definitions For Security against Covert Adversaries
Aumann and Lindell, [AL07] , give a formal definition of security against covert adversaries in the ideal/real simulation paradigm. This notion of adversary lies somewhere between those of semi-honest and malicious adversaries. Loosely speaking, the definition provides the following guarantee: Let 0 ≤ ≤ 1 be a value (called the deterrence factor). Then any attempts to cheat by an adversary is detected by the honest parties with probability at least . Thus provided that is sufficiently large, an adversary that wishes not to get caught cheating will refrain from attempting to cheat, lest it be caught doing so. Furthermore, in the strongest version of security against covert adversaries introduced in [AL07] , the adversary will not learn any information about the honest parties' inputs if he gets caught. Please see [AL07] for the detailed definitions.
Homomorphic Encryption
We use a semantically-secure public-key encryption scheme that allows for simple computations on encrypted data. In particular, we use encryption schemes where given two encryptions E(m 1 ) and E(m 2 ), we can efficiently compute a random encryption of m 1 + m 2 . We denote this by
. Note that this implies that given an encryption E(m) and c ∈ , we can efficiently compute a random encryption E(cm); we denote this by E(cm) = c × h E(m). For a matrix M We denote by E(M ) an entry-wise encryption of the matrix. Note that the above implies that two encrypted matrices can be added, and that we can compute a multiplication of an encrypted matrix by a matrix in the clear.
As an example for a homomorphic encryption scheme, we can use Pallier's [Pal99] cryptosystem. One minor issue is that the domain of Pallier's cryptosystem is the ring Z n , where n is the product of two large and secret primes. Though Z n is in fact not a field, any operation which separates it from a field leads to a factoring of n, and thus is unlikely to occur during a computation.
Definitions for the Information Theoretic Model
Linear Secret Sharing Schemes. To design our secure multiparty protocols, we use a linear secret sharing scheme (LSSS) to share values over a finite field . Each party receives a share that contains one or more field elements from the dealer. Each share is computed as a fixed linear function of the secret and some random field elements chosen by the dealer. 
Matrix Product Secure against Covert Adversaries
Given shares of two n × n matrices, we design a protocol for securely computing shares of the product matrix in the presence of a covert adversary in a small constant number of rounds and communication complexity O(n 2 ). It is possible to compile a O(n 2 ) communication matrix product protocol that is secure against semi-honest adversaries into a protocol that is secure against malicious adversaries using generic (or specially designed) zero knowledge proofs. However, we do not know how to do so without adding a significant overhead to the communication complexity of the original protocol.
The main idea is to break the input matrices into multiple additive shares and use a homomorphic encryption along with cut-and-choose techniques to perform the required computation on the shares. We further use the random strings of the encryption scheme to prove that the additive shares in fact add up to the original inputs. For this purpose, we need the homomorphic encryption to have an extra property: If one knows the random strings that correspond to the encryptions E(m 1 ), and E(m 2 ), one can efficiently compute the random string that corresponds to the encryption E(m 1 + m 2 ) = E(m 1 ) + h E(m 2 ).
We proceed to discuss the way in which a shared matrix is held in our protocols. In a sharing of a matrix M ∈ n×n , Alice holds (A, E b (B, r b ), r a ) and Bob holds (B, E a (A, r a ) , r b ), where A and B are random matrices subject to the condition that A + B = M , the strings r a and r b are uniformly random strings, and E a (·, ·) (E b (·, ·)) denotes encryption under Alice's (Bob's) public key. The remainder of this section is organized as follows: We start by formally defining the matrix product functionality in terms of the above secret sharing representation of the matrices. Then, we present our protocol for efficiently implementing this functionality.
Definition 1 (Matrix Multiplication Functionality). The matrix multiplication functionality (MatMul) is defined as follows:
Input to Alice:
A few remarks on this definition are in place. The inputs to the players contain two shared matrices (A 1 + B 1 ) and (A 2 + B 2 ), together with the matrix C (which is also Bob's share of the output) and the string r a , which is the random string according to which Alice encrypts her output. That is, we choose not to introduce randomness into the definition and leave the choices of C and r a to the protocols that use matrix product as a sub-protocol. This design choice was made to simplify the presentation of the protocol. But, it is not hard to construct on top of our protocol for this functionality, a protocol for a functionality with random C and r a as outputs. Hence we assume that we have access to a secure coin-tossing protocol such as the one given in [Lin01] .
To simplify the composition, we divide the protocol into several parts, where the parts will be performed sequentially one after the other. 
Alice's Computation

Alice writes her inputs as sums. For each i ∈ {1,
2 . 2. Bob proves his sums. For each i ∈ {1, 2}, Bob computes a string q0, such that
Bob sends q0 to Alice. Similarly, Bob computes a string t0 such that 
The computations that depend only on Bob were computed correctly Alice verifies that
Bob's homomorphic computations were correct For every j ∈ {1, 2}, Alice verifies that indeed The following theorem summarizes the results of this section. Theorem 1. Let n be a positive integer and consider matrices of dimension n × n. Given a secure coin-tossing functionality, the above protocol securely realizes the matrix product functionality, in presence of a covert adversary with deterrence probability = 1/4. The protocol is constant round and requires O(n 2 ) communication.
Output Computation
Due to lack of space, details of the simulators and proof of security appear in the full version. The above protocol in its current form is not secure under parallel composition due to the rewinding nature of the simulator in the proof. However, we can securely run many instances of the matrix product in parallel if (i) the same public key and encryption scheme is used for all instances and (2) the same challenges are used in all instances of the matrix product protocol. In fact, the description of the simulator in the proof for security of the parallel matrix product protocol will be almost identical to the simulator for the original protocol.
Secure Matrix Product in the Information Theoretic Model
Using standard techniques for multiplying two shared values leads to a simple protocol for matrix product in the information theoretic setting that requires O(n 3 ) communication. However, one can think of our element-wise secret sharing of the matrices as a secret sharing scheme over the matrix ring. In light of this observation, we can efficiently generalize the committed multiplication protocol of [CDM00] to a constant round committed matrix multiplication protocol that is secure against As we will see in future sections, secure computation of other linear algebra problems is reduced to a secure matrix product protocol. The guaranteed security is in part due to the existing general composition theorems in the informationtheoretic setting [KLR06] . 
From Matrix Singularity to Matrix Product
In this section we design a secure protocol for deciding singularity of a shared matrix given an efficient implementation of a secure protocol for matrix product. Our techniques apply to both two-party protocols secure against covert adversaries and multiparty protocols secure against computationally unbounded malicious adversaries. In Section 5.1, we design a constant round protocol for computing shares of the linearly recurrent sequence v, Mv, . . . , M 2n−1 v, given shares of a square matrix M and a vector v. Later, in Section 5.2, we apply this protocol to M and a random shared vector v, to reduce the problem of deciding the singularity of M into the problem of deciding the singularity of a related Toeplitz matrix T . In Section 5.3 we design a protocol for deciding singularity of a Toeplitz matrix, by applying the protocol for the linearly recurrent sequence on a different set of inputs. Finally, in Section 5.4, we connect all the above to get our main result: a secure constant round protocol for deciding shared matrix singularity with communication complexity O(n 2+1/t ) for every positive integer t.
Secure Computation of the Sequence {M i v}
Given secret shares of a matrix M ∈ n×n and a vector v ∈ n , our goal is to design a secure protocol for computing shares of the vector sequence {M i v} 1≤i≤2n . This construction is an important building block for the design of our matrix singularity protocol. Using the methods of [CKP07] 
From General Matrix Singularity to Toeplitz Matrix Singularity
In this section we reduce the problem of securely deciding the singularity of a general shared matrix M into the problem of securely deciding the singularity of a related shared matrix T . The proof of Theorem 4 relies on the following Lemmata. Due to lack of space, the full proof is defered to the final version of the paper. 
Lemma 3 ( [KS91]). Consider the matrix M ∈
T α = ⎛ ⎜ ⎜ ⎜ ⎜ ⎜ ⎜ ⎜ ⎜ ⎝ a α−1 a α−2 · · · a 1 a 0 a α a α−1 · · · a 2 a 1 . . . a α . . . . . . a 2 . . . . . . a 2α−3 a α−1 a 2α−2 a 2α−3 · · · a α a α−1 ⎞ ⎟ ⎟ ⎟ ⎟ ⎟ ⎟ ⎟ ⎟ ⎠
Deciding the Singularity of a Toeplitz Matrix
We test the singularity of a Toeplitz matrix by first computing its characteristic polynomial and then determining whether its constant coefficient is equal to zero or not. The well known lemma of Leverrier, connects the characteristic polynomial of a matrix to solution of a linear system that depends on the trace of powers of the matrix (see Appendix A). Particularly, if we compute the traces of matrices T 1 , . . . , T n , computing the characteristic polynomial reduces to inverting an invertible matrix for which there exist simple and efficient protocols in both settings. Hence, our main challenge remains to compute traces of powers of T in a round and communication efficient manner.
Denote by X ∈ [λ] n×n the matrix X = I +λT +λ 2 T 2 +. . .+λ n T n . Note that entries of X are polynomials of degree at most n in [λ] . Therefore, the trace of the matrix X is also a polynomial of degree at most n in λ. It is easy to see that coefficients of this trace polynomial are in fact the traces of powers of T . Hence, our goal is to compute the trace of X. However, as the naïve representation of the matrix X consists of n 3 field elements, we need to compute the trace of X in a more clever way.
Consider the matrix (
Since T is a Toeplitz matrix, the matrix (I − λT ) is Toeplitz as well. One may compute the power series extension (2) To compute Trace(X), it is sufficient to perform the following two steps (i) Compute the first and last columns of X: We apply Lemma 2 to compute the two sequences {T i e 1 } 1≤i≤n and {T i e n }1 ≤ i ≤ n where e 1 and e n are column vectors of 1, 0, . . . , 0 and 0, . . . , 0, 1 , respectively. This automatically gives us the first and last columns of X, and requires O(s) rounds and O(sn 2+1/s ) communication. (ii) Compute the trace of X using these two columns: This can be done based on Equation 2. Since every polynomial among u 1 . . . , u n , v 1 , . . . , v n is of degree at most n, multiplying two of these polynomials can be done in constant round and communication O(n) in both settings (see [MF06] ). Finally, dividing by u 1 , which is invertible modulo λ n+1 (since its constant coefficient is 1), can be done in constant round and with communication complexity O(n) (see [MF06] ). Hence, we conclude that computation of traces of T, T 2 , . . . , T n can be done in O(s) rounds and communication complexity O(sn 2+1/s ).
The Protocol for Matrix Singularity
The following protocol for testing singularity of a matrix combines all the techniques discussed in this section:
Theorem 5. Let n and s < n be a positive integers and consider matrices of dimension n × n. Other Linear algebra problems. Using existing techniques, one can efficiently and in constant round, reduce the task of secure computation of rank of a matrix and solving a linear system of equation to testing singularity of a matrix. It is easy to verify that the reductions will apply to both settings we considered in this paper. See [KMWF07] or the full version of this paper for more detail.
